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Introduction 
The so-called state committees (det statliga kommittéväsendet, valtion komitealai-
tos1) are a key institution in the history of governance and policy drafting in Sweden 
and Finland. Since the late 19th century, hardly any major public policy reform has 
taken place without the involvement of one or several such committees. They have 
typically been appointed by the government or by a ministry to investigate a matter 
of pressing public concern and prepare government bills to be given to parliament. 
Basically, at any point in time, there has been a whole network of state committees 
at  work  and,  in  a  longer  perspective,  they  form  a  chain  of  policy  making  efforts  
covering virtually every possible issue of public policy in modern society. Their 
policy recommendations have traditionally enjoyed high prestige and been turned 
into public policy usually with only minor modifications. In the event of disagree-
ments in the committees, the disputes have tended to be very fundamental by nature 
and often led to lively public debates. 
In a broader European perspective, the state committees stand out in two respects. 
First, despite their key role, they remained ad hoc by nature, operating outside of 
and in parallel to formal ministerial hierarchies. Secondly, over the years, the state 
committees developed into important meeting places for representatives of the state 
and civil society associations. Besides being invited to participate in the work of a 
committee or, at least, having the right to comment on its draft recommendations, 
associations and other groups of citizens have been successful in the initiation of 
numerous important committees. This openness of the state committees is in notable 
contrast with procedures for policy preparation in most other European countries 
where this type of task has typically been taken care of by a narrower circle of cabi-
net members and civil servants accompanied, potentially, by some external experts.  
 
1  In this article, the term state committees is used instead of government committees or com-
missions. This term is used to highlight the distinctive quality of the state committees and is 
also justified in light of the original Swedish and Finnish terms which both include explicit 
references to the state: det statliga kommittéväsendet, valtion komitealaitos. Concerning in 
particular the most wide-reaching policy reforms, the committee reports are published in spe-
cific publication series: valtion komiteamietinnöt in Finland and Statens Offentliga Utrednin-
gar (SOU-series) in Sweden.      
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The state committees symbolize many of those virtuous qualities that have com-
monly been associated with the distinctively “Nordic” model of governance – such 
as the accessibility, inclusiveness and co-participation of civil society actors in the 
making of public policy. The Swedish state committees in particular have been 
hailed as major “institutes for compromise” that underpin the “consensually orien-
tated, open, rational and deliberative” model of decision making for which Sweden 
is famous (Ruin 1969 cited Johansson 1992). Traditionally the state committees 
have worked in policy areas where broad societal consensus has been deemed par-
ticularly valuable – such as defense or economic policies – and/or dealt with issues 
that are highly controversial – such as labor market legislation (Premfors 1983; 
Thomas 1969; Meijer 1969). These qualities have turned the state committees into 
major arenas of political negotiation and often these negotiations have resulted in 
compromise and consensus. On the other hand, the practice of processing various 
opinions into a single written report with clear-cut recommendations – before the 
issue is opened up to parliamentary and wider public debate – is a strong signal of 
consensus.2 Over the years the state committees have evidently contributed to the 
almost trademarked ability of Sweden’s and Finland’s systems of governance to 
produce widely resonating and effectively implemented public policies. At the same 
time, they provide a concrete case in point regarding the “rigid but nonetheless ef-
fective practices of inclusion” which Henrik Stenius (in this volume) identifies as 
one of the main threads in the long narrative of Nordic associational life. No doubt, 
these “institutes for compromise” have facilitated weak notions of opposition and 
the smooth transition to modernity both of which Stenius links with this long-term 
narrative. By providing real opportunities for participation and influence, the com-
mittees have shaped associations and contributed to associations’ strong representa-
tive functions as intermediaries between the state and civil society – a tradition that 
has been seen as characteristic of Nordic associations (see also Alapuro in this vol-
ume; Alapuro 2005; Pohjantammi 2005). 
In the following pages, the state committees are discussed as institutions that il-
lustrate some key features of the “Nordic” state - civil society relationship and re-
lated patterns of associational life. Particular attention is given to the way in which a 
strong state has been associated with a similar strong tradition of association and 
civil society in Nordic political cultures and the role of state committees both in the 
making of this “paradox” and as a reflection of it. The article first places the state 
committees into the context of the “Nordic” traditions of the state and civil society. 
It then moves on to the institutional history of the state committees in Finland and, 
where relevant, Sweden. Regarding the post-1945 period, the analysis focuses on  
the state committees’ role within the neo-corporatist policy-making paradigm and 
 
2  According to Premfors’s (1983: 626) data on Sweden, only some 15% of reports have been 
flatly rejected by governments. 
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analyzes the case of Finland in comparison with another European case, Austria. 
The article ends with a brief look at the dissolution of the state committees as an 
institution in Finland in the 1990s.     
The Nordic paradox of a strong state and a strong civil society 
The combination of a strong state and a vital civil society is not often found in the 
history of Europe or the world at large. In light of established state and democratic 
theories, it even appears slightly paradoxical. At the same time, it is indubitably one 
of the most distinctive and characteristic features of Nordic political cultures. The 
tradition of the strong state and, more precisely, an almost seamless fusion of it with 
an equally strong civil society is, however, a recurrent, primary theme in the litera-
ture on Nordic political cultures – although variations, of course, are also identified. 
In this interpretation, Nordic political cultures are characterized by the absence of 
clear-cut boundaries between the state and civil society. Instead, in the border zones 
between the two, one finds dense networks of institutional interdependencies, and 
although the state has been seen as strong, it has not been discussed as being oppo-
site, or antagonistic, to civil society. Well-mobilized networks of civic associations, 
which are seen as covering a wide section of society, are an integral part of this 
interpretation of Nordic political cultures. In contrast to cases where the vitality of 
associational life indicates the weakness of the state and its lack of success in per-
meating its society, the Nordic interpretation pictures associations whose activities 
are in harmony with the state’s inclusive policies and where the two, thereby, en-
dorse one another (see Alapuro/Stenius in this volume; Alapuro 2005; Stenius 1987; 
1988; Sorensen/Stråth eds. 1997; Hernes 1988). 
The state committees are an illustrative case in point regarding institutional inter-
dependencies on the boundaries between the state and civil society and the ways in 
which the Nordic, “mutually endorsing”, relationship between the state and associa-
tions of civil society has been constructed in practice. In many ways the distinctively 
Nordic fusion of the state and civil society seems to call for this sort of an institu-
tion. The dynamics at the borders of the state and the rest of society are not however 
prefixed but shaped by historically changing ideas about the desired modes of inter-
action between the state and civil society. The state committees reflect these chang-
ing ideas but, simultaneously, possess the potential to shape the interaction as well 
as the involved actors.3    
 
3  In line with sociological and historical institutionalism, the concept of institution is used here 
to refer to the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that 
structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As 
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On closer examination, the state committees are characterized by a functional 
duality that is connected with the Nordic paradox of a strong state and a vital civil 
society. They, first and foremost, serve the purposes of effective government but, 
simultaneously, have created an important channel of influence and participation for 
civil society actors. From a government perspective, the incorporation of the actors 
involved has functioned as a means for solidifying the knowledge bases used in 
public authorities’ decision making and, at the same time, helped in the managing of 
particular policies. It has helped to anticipate potential resistance at an early stage 
and, thus, increased the likelihood of successful policy implementation. For repre-
sentatives of various associations and interest groups, on the other hand, the state 
committees have opened up a major channel for their participation, influence, and 
networking. Even though the participating associations have – more or less explicit-
ly – been expected to demonstrate a willingness to engage in cooperation, compro-
mise, and the adaptation of their particular interests for the sake of such abstractions 
as, for instance, the “common good” or the “national interest”, the state committees 
have also been focal sites for the spread and exchange of information, knowledge, 
beliefs, values, and even the construction of collective identities. Therefore associa-
tions have greatly valued an invitation to participate in a state committee and, on the 
other hand, often fiercely complained about not being invited onto committees in 
their field.  
Throughout their history, the state committees have been sites of thoroughly po-
liticized interest settlement. In Rune Premfors’s (1983: 628, 641) view, this interest 
settlement function is also one of the main factors that distinguishes the state com-
mittees from British commissions of inquiry, for instance, whose main aim has been 
to find “the truth” in a not politically motivated, “disinterested”, manner. However, 
the state committees too have always looked to the social and economic sciences in 
order to find “neutral” and “objective” concepts and facts. The intention is that these 
function as bridges between various interests and make the description and formula-
tion of recommendations as precise as possible. In Finland, for instance, whole gen-
erations of social scientists and economists have rehearsed their skills in the service 
of various state committees since the late 19th century.     
 
such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms but one that does not necessarily de-
rive from legal, as opposed to conventional, standing. The emphasis is on the relational char-
acter of institutions; that is to say, on the way in which they structure the interactions. Institu-
tions are dynamic and historically conditioned patterns and codes of conduct that both guide 
and are modified by collective interaction. Hall and Taylor (1996) provide a good overview 
on various streams of institutionalism. 
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The state committees in historical perspective   
Finland’s and Sweden’s state committees have a common historical background in 
the gradual consolidation of the structures of a centralized state administration in the 
mid 16th-century Kingdom of Sweden. Beginning in the 1660s, various committees 
were set up to draft large-scale reforms regarding such basic institutions in a modern 
state as the judiciary, the army, the church, schools, foreign exchange policies, and 
the regulation of industrial life (Tuori 1983; Hesslén 1927; Meijer 1956). In practice, 
these reforms postulated the consolidation of the king’s power vis-à-vis the landed 
nobility and, from the very beginning, the peasants, most of whom were independent 
land-owners in the non-feudal Kingdom, were invited to participate in the king’s 
royal committees. This alliance has often been pointed out as one of the main 
sources of Nordic democracy and active citizenship (Sorensen/Stråth 1997; Kettu-
nen 1999; 2001; Pohjantammi 2005), and, at least, it served to facilitate the emer-
gence of a peasantry that was actively engaged in attending to local administrative 
matters and, simultaneously, was loyal to the King and his attempts to embed the 
structures of the centralized state administration in local communities. Thus, as in 
the case of the later state committees, the early royal committees operated as bridges 
from the central state to civil society and thereby shaped the forms of association 
and participation. Secondly, the early committees also involved especially those 
groups in society whose consent and support was considered particularly critical to 
the success of the reforms at hand. In exchange for their consent and support, these 
important groups gained in influence.   
In 1809 Finland became an internally autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian 
Empire. From then on, Sweden and Finland cultivated their state committees’ tradi-
tions separately. In the second half of the 19th century many of the established so-
cial, political, economic, and cultural norms, values, and circumstances were chang-
ing rapidly and this was a turning point in the history of the state committees too. 
They were called upon to prepare large-scale reforms designed to meet the chal-
lenges and problems of industrialization and modernization. It now became common 
for a notable number of the participants in the committees to be recruited from out-
side the state bureaucracy. The role of experts and the incorporation of representa-
tives of various local and functional sectors of society and economic life gained in 
importance. As most of the late 19th and early 20th-century committees were work-
ing on matter of social and industrial life, workers being familiar with labor and 
factory conditions were invited to participate. In a way, by opening up to society, the 
committees also functioned as a kind of substitute for outright parliamentarism be-
fore this constitutional feature became established in Sweden or Finland (Tuori 
1983: 191-203, 218-219; Meijer 1956).  
The second half of the 19th century is an important period in the history of asso-
ciational life and the mobilization of civil society. Associations were formed in all 
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corners of the Nordic countries and across Europe (Stenius in this volume; Stenius 
1987). As for the state committees, this associational mobilization widened the spec-
trum from which potential committee members could be recruited. However, at this 
stage, the emergence of political parties, for instance, was not reflected to any great 
extent in the composition of the state committees. In Finland, committee members 
tended to be chosen on the basis of their personal expertise and experience – asso-
ciational and party affiliations were only of secondary, if any, importance. In some 
cases, an associational affiliation could even be considered as negative as was some-
times the case with members of the socialist labor movement. For the administra-
tion, the labor movement mobilization appeared more a source of potential unrest, 
which it tried to tame by drafting skillfully proactive policies in the state commit-
tees, however, not by inviting representatives of the movement to participate at this 
point of time (Tuori 1983).   
In late 1917, Finland declared its independence from Russia. The new republic 
was torn by a civil war between the socialist reds and non-socialist whites in 1918. 
Out of this, the resultant constitution of 1920 was a hybrid that combined a strong 
presidency with parliamentarism and Nordic traditions of local democracy. With the 
introduction of parliament and the president as the main symbols of sovereignty, the 
role of the administration, which had been the main symbol of Finland’s self-
determination since 1809, was reduced. The dominant ideals of democracy empha-
sized the role of parliament as the main arena for engaging organized interests, asso-
ciations, and citizens in public policy making and, accordingly, parliament and its 
committees – not the state committees – were regarded as the main arena for politi-
cal debates and decision making (Helander/Anckar 1983; Tiihonen 1985; 1999; 
Tuori 1983). This emphasis on parliament, however, by no means ruled out the in-
fluence and pressure exerted by closely overlapping economic, military, and cultural 
elites and associations in numerous direct but informal, non-institutionalized, and 
mostly private ways.  
Internationally, the state – society relationship and the boundaries between the 
public and private spheres became controversial issues with the rise of state-centered 
totalitarian regimes in the 1930s. There were plans in Finland, as in many other 
countries in these years, for the establishment of a permanent, constitutionally an-
chored economic council with corporatist representation structures but these were 
not carried through (see Tuori 1983; Tiihonen 1985). On the other hand, coping with 
the consequences of the Great Depression brought the need for more state-
intervention  and  coordination  in  public  policy  making  to  the  fore.  In  Sweden,  for  
instance, the state committees which had been the tools of weak minority govern-
ments in the 1920s, became forums for the planning of state-coordinated and publi-
cally financed measures to combat unemployment and foster the development of the 
economy and welfare state in the 1930s. Thus by this stage they were already func-
tioning as arenas of neo-corporatist cooperation between the state and the associa-
tions of business, labor, and agricultural producers (Karvonen/Lindström 1997; 
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Helander/Johansson 1998; Suomen Komitealaitos 1976; Huuska 1970). In Finland, 
neither these associations nor their mutual relations were institutionalized properly 
until the 1940s. Deriving back to the problematic legacies of the 1918 civil war, 
employer and business elites were reluctant to recognize the Trade Union Confede-
ration’s (henceforth SAK) right to represent workers. This meant that no cooperation 
could be built on any reciprocal basis between business and labor or if the state is 
included on a tripartite basis. It is important to note, however, that notwithstanding 
this lack of recognition, the SAK had regular contacts with the state administration. 
Representatives of the social democratic wing of the trade union movement partici-
pated in many state committees, especially in the field of social and labor reforms 
(Tuori 1983). The state thus showed its willingness to cooperate well before agree-
ment could be reached amongst the associations involved.  
In 1937, the two largest parties in Finland, the Agrarian Union and the Social 
Democrats, formed a coalition government that had a firm majority in parliament. At 
first sight, this so-called “Red-Earth” coalition seemed to bring Finland closer to the 
example of other Nordic countries where similar “strategic compromises” had pre-
ceded the launch of ambitious welfare policies which, to a large extent, were pre-
pared in various state committees. In Finland too, the new coalition started several 
social policy reforms, which were mostly planned in the state committees (see Kar-
vonen/Lindström 1997; Kalela 1987). In these years, as Pauli Kettunen (2001: 155) 
has noted, Finland’s social democrats managed to broaden the existing perceptions 
of “Nordic democracy” by introducing a reciprocal relationship and negotiations 
between the central associations of the trade union movement and employ-
ers/business and making this one of its cornerstones. Nonetheless, it took until 1940 
before the employers’ central association publicly recognized to the trade union 
confederation. This happened at a moment of great national crisis, the Winter War 
against the Soviet Union (1939-1940). However symbolic this recognition may have 
initially been, it did remove the obstacle that had blocked the “labor market parties’” 
Nordic type of cooperation in Finland. Consequently, the reciprocity between “the 
parties” – the employers’ and employees’ – was quickly established as a norm in the 
nomination of members to various state committees.  
The principle of equal participation rights for all associations gained in signifi-
cance during the war years when the boundaries between the state and civil society, 
the state and the economy, the public and private spheres, faded away almost com-
pletely. A centralized system of regulation was established in all vital fields of socie-
ty, economy, and associational life. In practice, the public authorities leaned on a 
number of broadly authorized state committees, councils and agencies in which 
representatives from various associations participated. In this framework, associa-
tions gained an unforeseen role, though, at the same time, they were forced to oper-
ate under strict war-time control. However, in contrast to the fascist regimes of the 
time, the social democratic trade union confederation was one of the key actors in 
this system. It gained in power and, in exchange, was expected to guarantee indus-
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trial and social peace on behalf of the country (Tuori 1983; Paavonen 1987; Kettu-
nen 2001).  
In post-war society, the central associations of organized labor, business, and 
agriculture were retain to and even increase their power in public policy making. 
This development related to the strengthening of the so-called neo-corporatist poli-
cy-making paradigm that had altered the state-society relationship and modes of 
associational life all across Europe. In Finland and Sweden, the state committees 
were one of the main arenas for neo-corporatist cooperation between associations 
and the state authorities.  
Neo-corporatist politics of participation in the post-1945 period 
Across Europe, public intervention in the post-war society and economy increased 
from what it had been before the war. The exceptional authorities of war-time were 
dismantled but only gradually as post-war reconstruction justified their continued 
existence for years to come. Economic policy was at the epicenter of this develop-
ment, and, in connection with increased public intervention, the rules of participa-
tion had to be rethought too. In many countries, the policies of the authoritarian 
states of the 1930s and 1940s had made the public suspicious of any state regulation 
and after the war, these reservations fused with Cold War enemy images of a state-
led “planned economy”. Historical burdens and contemporary concerns underlined 
the need for reconciling all public policy drafting with the principles of democracy. 
For historical reasons, this argument was deployed by the social democratic trade 
union movement and the political left in particular to justify their claims for ex-
tended participation rights. At the same time, post-war economic policy administra-
tors worked hard to establish more coordination in economic policy making and 
together these aims led to the elaboration of new types of neo-corporatist4 policy 
cooperation structures. As a result, the expanding state intervention of the post-war 
period was to go hand in hand with the permanent participation of the main interest 
associations, most notably those of the trade unions, the employers, business, and 
agricultural producers, in public policy making. For proponents of this development, 
it represented a shift from “pressure politics” to more cooperative, regulated, and, 
also, democratic, modes of policy making. By the 1960s and 1970s, the associations’ 
 
4  Neo-corporatism is associated with political economy and industrial relations but in advanced 
neo-corporatist systems its features cover a wide field of public policy. The prefix “neo” indi-
cates the difference between the corporatism of the post-1945 period and its earlier authoritar-
ian forms. 
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influence had extended to cover almost all sectors of public policy in many coun-
tries.  
There were several variations amongst the neo-corporatist systems. The research 
literature has typically classified them on the basis of the state’s role and the extent 
to which public status was attributed to the main interest associations in society. In 
Claus Offe’s definition (1981: 136-137, 140-141), for instance, corporatization was 
to increase with (1) the extent to which the resources of an interest association were 
supplied by the state, (2) the extent to which the range of representation was defined 
through public political decisions (3) the regulation of internal relations between 
rank-and-file members and executive members of associations and, finally (4), the 
extent to which interest associations were licensed and invited to assume, together 
with a specified set of other participants, a role in legislation, the judicial system, 
policy planning and implementation, or granted the right of Selbstverwaltung (self-
administration). The state often had a decisive role in the instigation and determina-
tion of this system since the corporatist framework was presumed to possess the 
capacity to deal with and “depoliticize” conflicts by a state-led determination of both 
the participants in a conflict, and the scope of strategies and tactics that were permit-
ted in the pursuit of conflicting interests. Philippe C. Schmitter, (1982: 296) has 
discussed this idea in terms of “regime governability”. For him, neo-corporatism is a 
specific mode of policy formation in which formally designated interest associations 
are incorporated within the process of authoritative decision making and implemen-
tation. As such, they become officially recognized by the state, not merely as interest 
intermediaries, but as “co-responsible partners” in governance and “societal guid-
ance”. The associations’ consent becomes necessary for policies to be adopted and 
their collaboration is essential for policies to be implemented (ibid.: 323). Schmitter 
has also made a widely cited distinction between societal, or liberal, and state corpo-
ratism that builds upon the varying role of the state in the different systems. For him, 
societal corporatism refers to societies where corporatism has developed incremen-
tally as a consequence of the growing monopoly of power held by interest associa-
tions. State corporatism in turn describes societies where corporatist design has been 
imposed more actively by the state from above. In historical reality, most systems 
mixed elements from both types. Moreover, an additional source of variations was 
that the reception and implementation of neo-corporatist ideas did not take place in a 
spatial or historical vacuum. All national contexts were embedded with inherited and 
existing ideas, traditions, and institutions of public policy making and, moreover, 
various ideas about the desired role of the state and civil society actors in it. These 
legacies influenced the ways in which new ideas were translated and fused with 
what was already there in different countries.  
In the research literature, Finland’s and Sweden’s neo-corporatism have not been 
seen as having much in common. Sweden’s neo-corporatism appears as one of the 
paragons of societal corporatism – due to the strong and independent role of the 
main associations, the early emergence of neo-corporatist cooperation, and, in rela-
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tive terms, the rather indirect involvement of the state authorities. Finland’s varia-
tion, in contrast, is regarded as belated, state-led, and limited. This is associated with 
the general lack of political, governmental, and labor market stability, the fragmen-
tation of the trade union movement into social democratic and communist factions 
as well as the consequent suspicions among business circles towards the trade union 
movement as a whole. On this basis, Finland has not been seen as meeting most of 
the requirements of stable neo-corporatism until the 1970s and, even then its neo-
corporatism remained “fair-weather corporatism” that was conditioned by the eco-
nomy’s fluctuations (Pekkarinen 1989; 1992; Rehn 1991). 
What has remained in the margins of attention is that both in Sweden and Finland, 
the post-war decades’ efforts at neo-corporatist cooperation led to a powerful revital-
ization and unforeseen expansion of the state committees. Indeed, effective policy 
coordination required not only the neo-corporatist cooperation of the key groups of 
economic life but also interaction with the public authorities and, in quite concrete 
terms, arenas for this interaction. In Sweden and Finland, the state committees were 
at hand for these purposes. In Sweden, state committees had been arenas for a neo-
corporatist style of policies already before the war. As to Finland, two points are in 
order: first, this participation was established well before the introduction of the 
incomes policy agreements that are typically seen as the symbol of neo-
corporatism’s arrival in Finland and, secondly, even within the incomes policy 
framework, the state committees remained central to their preparation. The follow-
ing sections first take a look at the numerical and structural development of the state 
committees as an institution in Finland, and to an extent Sweden. Then they discuss 
the introduction of the incomes policies in Finland and the role of state committees 
and associations in it.    
* * * 
In line with neo-corporatist ideas, representatives of the central confederations of the 
trade unions, agrarian producers, employers and the main business associations were 
systematically involved in the state committees of the post-war years. This began 
with their involvement in pursuing war-time objectives and then in post-war recon-
struction tasks but gradually turned into peace-time neo-corporatist cooperation. 
This impressive growth in the number of state committees can be traced in the fol-
lowing figures: in 1950, the number of committees at work was approximately 230, 
in 1960 it was already around 330 and in 1970 it was around 530. In the record year 
1974, the number of committees was six times higher than it had been in 1958 (see 
e.g., Huuska 1970:7-8; Helander 1979: 226; Helander/Anckar 1983: 33-34; Suomen 
Komitealaitos 1976: 28). A similar growth in numbers took place in Sweden too, but 
in Finland in particular, it went hand in hand with the increasing administrative 
regulation of the committees as an institution. For the first time in its long history, 
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this ad hoc institution was given explicit definition in a statute issued by the gov-
ernment in 19585 which was regularly updated until the 1990s.  
From an administrative perspective, the increased formalization provided new 
opportunities for the control of the activities of the expanding network of commit-
tees. As a side effect, it strengthened the concentration of the committee seats in the 
hands of a relatively small number of the most important interest associations. By 
the end of the 1960s, the main associations active in the fields of industrial life and 
labor markets, in particular, had established a firm hold over the seats in the most 
important committees (Helander 1979: 229-235). In the statutes, the amount of 
clauses regulating these associations’ participation and, more importantly, the allo-
cation of the seats amongst them increased too. Through the committees, these asso-
ciations’ influence quite effortlessly spread to policy fields that were relatively re-
mote from their original range of activities and interests. As an example, one may 
mention education and cultural policies or, even, matters of national defense. (e.g., 
Helander/Anckar 1983; Rainio-Niemi 2008). 
The systematic use of the state committees as a policy preparation platform made 
them an inextricable part of the post-1945 search for consensus in politics, econom-
ics, cultural, and social life. Representatives of participating associations became 
central actors in this framework. It seems that the strengthening of the state commit-
tees also strengthened the associations: the committees’ expansion coincided with a 
steady numerical growth of all types of associations as well as with an impressive 
wave of organizational centralization within them. With their explicit aim of incor-
porating relevant associations in policy making, the state committees undoubtedly 
facilitated this development. Only registered associations could claim seats in the 
committees and the registration procedures already as such tended to standardize the 
associations’ structures. This applies to the whole spectrum of associations. Even 
though the participation of the most powerful industrial and labor market associa-
tions has attracted the most attention, a wide array of other associations also partici-
pated in the committees right from the start.  
One group whose role remained significant in the state committees were civil ser-
vants. This applies to Finland in particular where civil servants’ participation grew 
as the share of members of parliament shrank from the 1950s, reaching its nadir in 
the 1970s (Helander/Johansson 1998: e.g., 155; Suomen komitealaitos 1976; cf. 
 
5  Valtioneuvoston päätös komiteoista 6.3.1958/112, Statsrådets beslut om kommittéer 
6.3.1958/112, Suomen Asetuskokoelma 1958. In the statute of 1958 a committee was defined 
as an ad hoc organ (tilapäinen elin/tillfälligt organ) composed of two or more persons. They 
were commissioned by the central government to investigate a particular theme and had to 
submit a written report on it. The 1958 statute did distinguish between three different sub-
types of state committees. It decreed a variety of administrative and technical details to be 
followed but gave no instructions for the selection of members, or for the allocation of man-
dates. This aspect changed in the course of the1960s. 
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Karvonen 1978). This was compensated, however, by the frequency of parliamenta-
ry committees composed solely of MPs as well as by the fact that in the 1970s most 
high-ranking civil servants were more or less affiliated with some of the political 
parties. At the same, the work of the state committees was to a growing extent mod-
eled on the ideals of scientific inquiry and the share of social scientists and econo-
mists amongst the participants was on the rise (e.g., Premfors 1983: 628; also see 
Helander/Anckar 1983; Helander/Johansson 1998). Especially from the 1960s on-
wards, the state committees in Finland were one of the most important platforms on 
which the knowledge and techniques of modern social research were rehearsed, 
disseminated, and linked with the practices of public policy making.  
Despite the existence and strengthening of the state committees as rather refined 
instruments of policy coordination and cooperation since the end of the Second 
World War, the politics of interests remained highly unpredictable in Finland until 
the late 1970s. The comparatively strong presence of communism on the party polit-
ical map and within the trade union movement after 1945 merely added to the com-
plexity of interest and party politics. In addition, in the core fields of neo-corporatist 
policies, the main industrial and labor market associations – including the agrarian 
producers as one of the key players in the conflict – were engaged in zero-sum  
battles over the general level of prices and wages. These battles paralyzed one state 
committee after another and because of the government’s direct involvement in 
negotiations and various dependencies between the political parties and the main 
associations, they also adversely affected government cooperation and broke one 
coalition after another. This negative spill-over, which in fact also spread through 
the whole network of state committees covering a wide field of public policy, had a 
destabilizing influence on the entire society.  
Associations’ participation in the making of incomes policy   
To a large extent incomes policy agreements emerged in Finland as an attempt at 
remedying the instabilities caused by the battles over wages and prices of the 1950s. 
These agreements covered wages, prices, unemployment benefits, pensions, agricul-
tural subsidies, and many other issues of social and economic policy. In economic 
terms, the main aim was to curb inflation and in societal terms, to find an arrange-
ment that would help to stabilize the politics of interests. In the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development in Europe (OECD), incomes policy mod-
els had been discussed throughout the 1960s. The idea of voluntary agreements 
amongst associations representing the main groups in labor markets and industrial 
life was at the core of these considerations and, accordingly the intention was that 
the state authorities should not be involved, at least not directly and officially. In 
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reality, the role of government seldom remained this small in any country and this 
applies in particular to Finland. No matter how much it was argued that “the state” 
should adopt the role of a formally non-involved actor, given the all-encompassing 
character of the incomes policy agreements given, successive cabinets, and even the 
president, proved ready and able to bring all their authority to bear in order to secure 
and implement the incomes policy pacts. They were considered to be in the national 
interest. Already the first agreement, signed in March 1968, had been explicitly 
conditional on the introduction of a considerable degree of government authority in 
all fields of the incomes policy agreement and the package of social reforms that 
went with it. The government’s bill to parliament was, in essence, an enabling law 
that allowed the cabinet to realize all the reforms it considered necessary in order to 
keep to the agreements made with the main associations. In the parliamentary debate 
(for more see Myllymäki 1979: 58-59), these measures gave rise to questions re-
garding the role of parliament regarding the incomes policy: was parliament merely 
required to give its approval to decisions already made between the government and 
the associations before the pact had even been brought to parliament for debate?  
A look at the arenas on which policies relating to income policy agreements were 
drafted, brings us back to the state committees. Evidently, a large part – though by 
no means all – of the blossoming of the institution in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was a direct result of the introduction of incomes policies in Finland. By the late 
1970s, the incomes policy procedure had directly given rise to 160 statutes of which 
100 were laws regarding employment, social, and educational policy. Indirectly, it 
gave rise to many more. Most of these laws and decrees were drafted in state com-
mittees that were explicitly or implicitly connected to the making and implementa-
tion of incomes policies. (Helander/Johansson 1998: 118, 134; Myllymäki 1979: 
190-197; Helander/Anckar 1980; Helander 1979). The existence of strong, well-
consolidated interest associations was among the most important preconditions for 
the successful realization of these incomes policies. One example is the Trade Union 
Conferederation (SAK) which had split into two central associations in the late 
1950s but was reunited in 1969 after the introduction of the incomes policy proce-
dure. By 1974, the SAK had more members than all the political parties in Finland 
put together.6  
Acquiring a say in the incomes policy framework, which covered a wide field of 
social and educational policies, strengthened associations in general. Even though 
 
6  The need for strong interest associations as a precondition of successful incomes policies is 
strongly present on the pages of the economic council’s reports on incomes policy in 1965 
and especially 1967. For a more detailed discussion see Rainio-Niemi 2008. The position of 
the various interest associations was also strengthened by the introduction of a practice ac-
cording to which, since the late 1960s, membership fees could be deducted directly from the 
employees’ wages and salaries. The government was active in amending the law so that these 
fees became tax-deductible. 
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moderating the destabilizing effects of the battles over incomes on Finland’s eco-
nomic and political development had been the main motivation for the introduction 
of the incomes policies with the agreement between the main interest associations 
remaining the core issue, a whole range of smaller associations that had not pre-
viously been incorporated to such an extent were invited to participate. Moreover, 
once an association had participated in any of the committees preparing incomes 
policies, it  could claim seats on several others which, in one way or another, could 
be seen to fall within the incomes policy framework and in the association’s field of 
interests. Within only a few years, this mechanism led to a strong concentration of 
the committee seats in the hands of those associations that participated in the in-
comes policy procedure, especially the largest ones.  
In many respects, the introduction of incomes policy seemed to achieve many of 
its objectives (e.g., Helander/Johansson 1998; Myllymäki 1979; Helander/Anckar 
1983; Pekkarinen 1992; Arter 1987). From the administrative perspective, the intro-
duction of the incomes policy made it easier to predict and control the behavior of 
the powerful interest associations – something that had not been achieved in the 
1950s and early 1960s. The pacts also gave a strong incentive for the formation of 
majority rather than minority governments: only through firm parliamentary majori-
ties could a cabinet coalition guarantee that, first, the enabling acts and, secondly, all 
the other legal reforms which, it had been agreed a priori would be linked with the 
incomes policy deals, could be implemented. By these means the introduction of the 
incomes policy procedure lengthened the average term of government coalitions as 
well.  
The key features that emerge from the preceding analyses are emphasized in a 
wider European perspective. The following section therefore takes a look at another 
European but non-Nordic case, Austria, where neo-corporatism was likewise in the 
making in the post-1945 period.  
European perspectives: neo-corporatism and economic chambers in Austria  
The Austrian variant of post-1945 corporatism counts amongst the archetypes of 
modern neo-corporatism. One of its core institutions was the system of economic 
chambers which were at least as distinctive to post-1945 Austria as the state com-
mittees to Finland and Sweden. Both are institutions that are based on older histori-
cal traditions and were modified on these grounds to meet the challenges of post-
1945 neo-corporatism in their respective political cultures. Both have shaped associ-
ational life and in many ways reflect the broader traditions of their respective states 
and civil societys – the relatively centralized and homogeneous Nordic version ver-
sus the Central European federal and “pillarized” one.    
 255 
The system of economic chambers consists of equally authoritative chambers for 
(1) labor and wage-earners, (2) business and employers, and (3) agricultural produc-
ers.  Membership  in  a  chamber  is  compulsory  for  every  citizen  who  is  gainfully   
employed in industry and manufacturing (Chamber of Labor), is a managerial mem-
ber and/or owner of some business establishment ranging from the corner shop to a 
big company (Chamber of Business), or is engaged in agricultural pursuits of any 
kind (Chambers of Agriculture). Their compulsory membership gives the chambers 
a practical monopoly in the representation of various economic, social, industrial, 
and labor market interests. The core of the chambers’ formal influence is their legal-
ly constituted right of self-governance that guarantees them wide influence on policy 
making on the one hand and gives them a degree of authority in certain public and 
social security tasks on the other. The chambers are entitled to participate in a very 
wide range of public policy making through the so-called Advisory Procedure (Be-
gutachtungsrecht) meaning that they have to be consulted at various stages of policy 
and law preparation. In addition, chambers have the right to initiate legislative pro-
posals (Talós 1993; 1985; Klose 1970; Markovits 1996; Neuhauser 1966; Marin 
1982). 
Whilst it can plausibly be argued that a fully formed system of chambers only ex-
isted in the post-1945 period only, some chambers had existed earlier. The history of 
the chambers of commerce goes back to the 19th century and it set the pattern for 
the subsequent organization of the other chambers as well (Pütz et al.  1966; Klose 
1970). In the post-1945 era, the chambers were (re)created for the main sectors of 
economic life to manage the transition from the Third Reich to the Second Republic. 
As parts of this overall framework, which allowed them more public responsibilities 
and greater self-governance, the chambers achieved the position of being “legally 
sanctioned parastatist institutions” (Markovits 1996: 9). Indeed, it was only in the 
post-1945 period that the chambers gained practical significance as one of the main 
platforms of interest mediation and policy negotiation on the boundaries between the 
state and civil society. It is in this sense that they can be discussed as functional 
equivalents to the state committees in post-1945 Finland. Moreover, the purposes of 
governance and interest management were decisive in the initiation of both, even 
though on different grounds.    
In Austria, “voluntary” associations also operated in and through the chambers 
which became the main channels of influence vis-à-vis the public authorities, other 
relevant interest groups, and the processes of public policy making. Office holders in 
the chambers were chosen in internal elections in which various associations fielded 
candidates. One specific feature is that more or less all of the voluntary associations 
in post-1945 Austria were directly affiliated with, and controlled by, the two main 
political parties, the social democrats (henceforth the SPÖ) and the catholic conser-
vative People’s Party (henceforth the ÖVP). Thus these parties also reigned over the 
chambers: the ÖVP was dominant in the chambers of business and agriculture and 
the SPÖ in the chamber of labor. A closer look at the chambers reveals that they in 
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fact were not the true power holders as such but, more like, platforms for various 
interest associations that were connected to the two big parties. The exceptional 
interpenetration between the two main channels of interest mediation – the party 
political and corporate-functional ones – and their fusion in the institution of the 
economic chambers has earned post-1945 Austria such nicknames as “the chamber 
state” and, even more perceptively, the “party state”. 
Behind this constellation one finds a set of traditions that differ from the Nordic 
ones and have been shaped by Austria’s previous position as the core of the multi-
national Habsburg Empire. In contrast to the Grand Duchy of Finland, where party 
political mobilization carried strong national connotations across all social divisions, 
in Austria political, ideological, and religious differences were decisive. By the mid-
19th century, the population in the mainly German-speaking provinces had split into 
three main political groups; the catholic conservative (“Black”, later the ÖVP), the 
anti-clerical socialist (“Red”, later the SPÖ), and the less coherent group of secular-
liberals that favored nationalism in pan-German, not in Austrian, terms. In this con-
text, the political parties have been discussed as Lagers (“camps”) to underline their 
nature as something more encompassing than ordinary political parties. They have 
instead been seen as political arms of “sub-cultures” which rested on parallel net-
works of associations accompanying a person “from the cradle to the grave” and 
thus bringing all social and associational life under their purview.7 Within the many 
spheres of self-governance that were typical of the indirect nature of imperial rule, 
these politico-ideological groups and their associations were integrated into the 
structures of provincial self-government and cherished ideals most of which were at 
the same time supra-, sub-, and trans-national.  
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the multinational Habsburg empire in 1918, 
the parties in the provisional parliament were the main organizational units that were 
left at the central level of the dissolved state. The Austrian constitution of 1920 (re-
enacted in 1945) is famous in the history of constitutions due to the strong role of 
parliament and, in practice, of the political parties in parliament. In this constella-
tion, the only institution that had any operational and formal authority above parlia-
ment was the constitutional court, which could be asked by the provinces to scruti-
nize the constitutionality of federal level acts. Otherwise parliament was sovereign 
whilst the government was also very dependent on parliament: the government was 
at no juncture to be allowed to become a representative, or wielder, of state power in 
any sense that was beyond the control of parliament and the political parties. An 
 
7  Since the late 1960s and, especially, since the mid-1980s, researchers have identified trends 
of “de-pillarization” marking the loosening of the hold of the traditional Lagers’ over politi-
cal and social life. The classical “pillarized” cases in Europe are the Netherlands and Switzer-
land where societal pillarization, unlike in Austria, encompasses a linguistic dimension as 
well. 
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individual minister’s authority in her/his field of administration was strongly pro-
tected from potential pressures from other ministers and from the government as a 
whole, and this ruled out much inter-ministerial coordination by a government or the 
administration.  
In the event that the political parties in parliament were unable to cooperate there-
by rendering parliament unable to exercise its power, the constitution pointed to no 
clear mechanism for solving the deadlock. This became evident as the political par-
ties became increasingly hostile towards one another by the mid-1920s with these 
hostilities becoming one of the main vehicles for the dissolution of democracy in 
Austria. In order to restore some sort of order in society, the ruling Christian social 
party (the predecessor of the post-1945 ÖVP) inaugurated a one-party Corporate 
State (Ständestaat) in 1934. It was preceded by the closing down of parliament and 
the prohibition of all alternative parties and associations. Representation was to be 
organized along occupational-corporatist lines and would be under authoritarian 
state  control.  It  has  been  noted  that  in  several  ways  this  Ständestaat was  in  the  
process of creating corporatist institutions that, on paper, were similar, albeit in an 
embryonic form, to the structures that were later to be erected in the post-1945 Re-
public (Ucakar 1985; Talós 1993; 1985, Talós/Kittel 1995; Stourzh 1986). In 1938, 
however, this authoritarian corporate state was liquidated with the Anschluss of 
Austria to the Third Reich under the leadership of the national socialists. Both the 
Ständestaat and national socialist regime were imposed upon society by force and 
upheld by repression that divested the citizens of their democratic and, especially in 
the latter case, basic human rights.  
After the regime collapsed in 1945, the dominant line was the sharing of supreme 
power so that the state’s authority could no longer be used by one group against the 
others. In practice this turned out to mean a solidly cemented form of power sharing 
between  the  two  main  parties  the  Social  Democrats  (SPÖ)  and  the  Catholic  Con-
servative People’s Party (ÖVP). The bipolar power sharing lasted until the 1990s 
and became embedded in the country’s political, social, economic, and cultural 
structures. Until 1966, the two parties formed a coalition government that was 
backed by a formidable 90 percent of seats and votes in parliament. After 1966, the 
established power-sharing practices continued to live on by proxy, most notably, in 
the guise of the “paracoalition of Social Partnership” – the core of neo-corporatist 
cooperation between the chambers and, more notably, the party-affiliated associa-
tions acting through them. Despite its tumultuous past, post-1945 Austria had turned 
into a society that was addressed in the literature as the “archetype of neo-
corporatism” and “a paradigm of hyper-stability, social peace, and prosperity” (see 
e.g., Markovits 1996; Sully 1989). 
The post-1945 system of bipolar and multi-level power sharing had formative ef-
fects on the way in which the structures of neo-corporatist coordination and coopera-
tion were established in Austria. At the same time, the preoccupation with the pro-
tection of each group’s share in this arrangement strengthened those traditions which 
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among other things, ran contrary to efforts of policy coordination that were in fash-
ion internationally. As an example one can point out an early 1950s’ effort to estab-
lish a government commission, the so-called Economic Directorate (Wirtschaftsdi-
rektorium der Bundesregierung, 1951-1954, henceforth ED) for the coordination of 
economic policy at the central state level.8 This effort was motivated by the ideal of 
having a more coordinated economic policy and having strings attached to the re-
ceiving of financial aid (the so-called Marshall plan), which in many points pre-
sumed the existence of centralized government authorities. Within Austria, the initi-
ative came primarily from civil servants involved in Austrian economic policy ad-
ministration  and  the  use  of  the  Marshall  Aid  funds.  However,  any  allocation  of  
extended authority to the central government was not easy to implement, owing to 
the many formal and informal restrictions of its authority vis-à-vis parliament, the 
provinces, and, after 1945, the chambers. Even though future economic aid to Aus-
tria was widely understood to be dependent on the government’s ability to perform 
here, the case of the ED proves that this was not simple.   
Besides policy coordination, a strong cooperative element was inherent to the 
planned ED. Its participants consisted of key ministers, civil servants, representa-
tives from the three chambers, the Austrian National Bank, as well as the Austrian 
trade union federation (ÖGB). Very soon, the ED became intertwined with its partic-
ipants’ differing aspirations to reform economic policy making. On this point, the 
spectrum of opinions varied considerably: from the perspective of business and 
employers, the ED’s coordination capacities at first seemed a way out of the exces-
sive use of the unanimity principle in decision making. This criticism was targeted at 
the veto-powers that the chambers and the Chamber of Labor and the Trade Union 
Federation the ÖGB, in particular, had enjoyed since 1945. However, what for some 
appeared as unnecessary inefficiency, was for others a democratically constituted 
right to participate and influence. This influence and participation were assets the 
ÖGB, the Chamber of Labor, and the SPÖ were not ready to bargain over. Disputes 
that revolved around the chambers’ veto powers on decision making marked the 
debates on and in the ED from the very beginning. Despite growing disagreements, 
the  initial  one-year  mandate  of  the  ED  was  prolonged  by  two  more  years  by  the  
Austrian parliament in June 1952. New problems were ahead however: in the spring 
of 1952, the provincial government of the westernmost of Austria’s nine provinces, 
Vorarlberg, (where the socialists were traditionally weak) used its right to request 
the Constitutional Court to scrutinize whether current administrative practices em-
bodied in the ED and concerning foreign trade issues in particular violated the con-
stitutionally guaranteed competences of individual ministers. The Constitutional 
Court declared part of the procedures in the ED unconstitutional even though the ED 
 
8  The study on the Economic Directorate is based on a detailed analysis of primary sources 
deposited at the Austrian State Archives in Vienna. For more details see, Rainio-Niemi 2008.   
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as such – given that it would be divested of all potential authority – could continue its 
activities. Regardless of this decision, the ED had already lost most of its significance 
in practice and soon ceased to convene altogether.  
In post-1945 Austria, the problems that emerged in the connection with the ED led 
to the central state authorities’ rapid and permanent withdrawal from the role of an 
actively involved policy coordinator or compromise-builder in the making of eco-
nomic policies. After some years’ interlude, economic policy cooperation and coordi-
nation was re-established successfully. This happened, resolutely, within the sphere 
where the government was no longer directly involved nor providing an arena for 
cooperation. A suitable framework was found in the Parity Commission of Wages 
and Prices which was then to become the core of the famous Austro-Corporatism and 
Social Partnership. This commission was established in 1957 by mutual agreement 
between the Presidents of the Federal Chamber of Business and of the Trade Union 
Confederation that dominated the Chamber of Labor. It was a platform for coopera-
tion between the chambers and through them to associations affiliated with the main 
political parties. The state authorities – administrative or governmental – were not 
directly or officially involved. In practice this non-involvement was not so evident, 
not least because of the extraordinary role of the two ruling parties that penetrated all 
levels and sectors of governance in society. In 1957-1963, the Parity Commission 
went through a phase of institutional consolidation and turned into an extensive net-
work of various negotiation arrangements. In this framework, economic policy ex-
perts  worked together  with  “social  partners”  (the  chambers,  the  ÖGB and other  in-
fluential associations) on different aspects of economic and social policy. By the 
1970s, the Parity Commission, which in formal terms was completely uninstitutional-
ized, had established its position as the power center of Austrian economic policy 
making and maintained this position well into the 1990s.  
* * * 
The above discussions have aimed to demonstrate the meaning of inherited traditions 
and institutions for the translation of the ideas of policy coordination and neo-
corporatist cooperation. The state committees in Finland and the economic chambers 
in Austria were discussed as prime examples and the differences that they reflect 
derived back to differing conceptions of the state and civil society.  
In Finland associations and political parties were faced with the firmly established 
institutional capacities and legitimacy of the state as a societal actor. In Austria, any 
attempts at state-building met powerful resistance from various well-established 
“sub-polities” within society, After 1945, the two main parties’ power sharing and 
cautious watch over the inviolability of their own positions strengthened these ten-
dencies considerably. As a result, in post-1945 Austria “the state” was in practice not 
much more than the two halves – the parties – that shared its power. These parties 
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that rested on well-established power bases that cut across civil society and its associ-
ations. In many ways, post-1945 Austria is an almost diametrically opposite case to 
Finland: while the politics of interests were effectively controlled and coordinated by 
the two big political parties, the institutional capacities and legitimacy of the central 
state was much more restricted and historically burdened than in Finland.  
In Finland, the state enjoyed an historically grounded legitimacy and could easily 
establish “itself” as an arena for coordination and cooperation. The ability to lean on 
the tradition of the state committees was instrumental here and, in contrast to Austria, 
questions on fundamental principles or administrative formalities never gained much 
in weight. Through the state committees, ideals and practices of coordination spread, 
and the incorporation of pivotal associations could take place in a smooth manner 
without legal frictions, in comparison with Austria. In Finland, the problems lay 
elsewhere, most notably, in the general instability in party, interest, and government 
politics that existed in parallel with the refined institutional designs for the pursuit of 
effective and legitimate state-led coordination and cooperation policies. In contrast to 
Austria’s “hyper-stability”, in Finland, the two “tiers” of interest mediation – elector-
al-territorial and corporate-functional (Rokkan 1999: 261) – and the rest of associa-
tional life did not fall into any clear-cut blocs. The associations’ links to political 
parties were many but, nevertheless, not clear and predictable to the same extent as in 
Austria. The result was a highly complicated and hard to identify network of criss-
crossing alliances and loyalties that oscillated in response to shifts in the balance of 
power and battles for it. It took a while until a functioning framework of coordination 
and cooperation could be found. As the history of the incomes policy pacts shows, in 
Finland the state remained strongly involved in the management of society’s various 
interests.  
The post-1945 neo-corporatist development had a profound influence on the state, 
civil society, and associations. It opened options for associations to exert real influ-
ence and yet, by favoring the most powerful industrial and labor market associations, 
it narrowed the conceptions of what civil society and its associations were all about. 
This development is particularly visible in post-1945 Finland and Sweden and makes 
neo-corporatism an important part of the history of associations in Nordic societies.  
Transforming the paradigms of participation: the demise of an institution in 
Finland  
The expansion of the state committees as an institution faced growing criticism from 
the 1970s. There were both practical and normative-ideological traits in this criti-
cism. Instead of paying attention to the virtues of accessibility and participation, or 
coordination and cooperation, the critics pointed to other trends such as corporatiza-
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tion, technocratization and bureaucratization of policy making in the state commit-
tees. The committees were seen to represented symbolic responses to political pres-
sures and were used to postpone and avoid effective government action. A contro-
versial issue could be buried in a committee and thus removed from the public agen-
da until it became irrelevant or was otherwise forgotten.9 It was argued that the 
committees had turned into trust-building exercises amongst the leaders of the most 
powerful associations, and, in addition, from a very practical perspective, the grow-
ing costs and, especially, the inefficiency of the state committees were pointed out 
by the critics (Helander/Anckar 1983; Djupsund/Ståhlberg 1978; Johansson 1992). 
Similar accusations were faced by neo-corporatist policy making in other countries 
too, including Austria. The influence of “extra-parliamentary” forces’ on govern-
ment policies together with state-intervention had detrimental effects on liberal de-
mocracy . The semi-public authorization of the most powerful organizations reduced 
the plurality of associational life, and, moreover, neo-corporatism’s success at keep-
ing political life stable and effective had been purchased at the price of organiza-
tional sclerosis, the perpetuation of inequalities, and a disregard for liberal demo-
cratic norms of citizen participation and accountability 
Despite this criticism, the state committees retained much of their importance as 
perhaps the most important sites for the negotiation and conclusion of numerous 
policy compromises that were crucial to the introduction of Nordic-type welfare 
policies in Finland and Sweden. The post-war growth of the committees as an insti-
tution, which peaked in the mid-1970s, coincided with the most active expansion of 
the welfare state. After this point, their growth gradually slowed down. In Finland, 
the statute on the state committees was updated in 1988 and 1990 as usual but after 
this point the centuries’ old institution dissolved within the space of only few years. 
By the mid-1990s, the state committees had lost their former shape and significance 
as a framework of participation and as an arena of policy drafting. The decrease in 
the number of state committees is illustrative: while there had been around 250 
committees at work annually in the 1960s and 1970s, in 1990 the number was 47 
and, in 1999, six (Helander/Johasson 1998: 246, 248). In 2002, the statute on the 
state committees was repealed altogether. In Sweden the state committees as an 
institution went through transformations too – for instance, the number of MPs grew 
at the expense of representatives from the main interest associations (Helan-
der/Johansson 1998: 157-158) – but nonetheless, the institution was not dissolved.  
In a study based on interviews with civil servants about the practices of policy 
preparation in Finland, the interviewees almost unanimously saw the state commit-
 
9  Djupsund/Ståhlberg (1978: 203) lists the latent and manifest functions of the state commit-
tees. For critical voices, see also the journal Sosiologia volumes 1 and 2/1969. Huuska (1970) 
is a response to the criticism of state committees.     
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tees as old-fashioned, too slow, and too expensive.10 None of the interviewees saw 
any point in reviving this institution, which, in addition to all the many practical 
defects suffers from a bad reputation; thus, if revived, it  would first have to be re-
named (Temmes 2001: 16-18). Considering Finland’s accession to the European 
Union in 1995 and its impact on law and policy preparation (Tala/Litmala 2006; 
Lampinen et al. 1998), it is easy to assume that the state committees’ way of prepar-
ing policies is now indeed outdated and too slow. Since the 1990s, Finland has also 
been among the most active public sector reformers among the OECD countries 
(Harrinvirta 2000).  
Irrespective of the reasons behind the dissolution of the state committees, their 
demise has taken away the frame in which associations have traditionally partici-
pated in public policy making. Actual policy preparation is mostly done within  
ministries, and the role of civil servants and their personal contact networks has  
been strengthened (e.g., Temmes 2001: 14-15). In the preparation of the more im-
portant reforms, the use of “one man committees” has become common. In contrast 
to the state committees, the prevailing procedures include less, or, at least, less sys-
tematic, consultation of representatives of various associations in the course of the 
process. Of course, public hearings are held and written comments are requested but 
this type of influence tends to remain narrow and arbitrary. At the same time, keep-
ing in mind the state committees’ obvious tendency to favor the most powerful asso-
ciations, many of them have not lost much of their influence irrespective of the de-
mise of state committees. Their influence has nonetheless become more scattered, 
informal and in comparison to the heydays of neo-corporatism, much more difficult 
to figure out. Simultaneously, associations in general have become more dependent 
on lobbying.  
These changes reflect some more general changes in the desired models of de-
mocracy, in the patterns of civil society participation, and in state – society interac-
tion.  If  there  was  a  turn  in  the  conceptualizations  of  democracy  and  civil  society  
participation in the 1950s and 1960s – one that emphasized that civil society was 
being composed of various interest groups – the most recent turn seems to think of 
civil society participation in primarily individual terms. The shift seems to corre-
spond with the turn from pluralism and neo-corporatism to individualism and delib-
erative theories of democracy: while the former were criticized for treating society 
as a relatively homogenous national entity, made up of large and fixed groups with 
stable interests, the latter have been challenged for their tendency to erase the dy-
namics of power and conflict that are vital to the formation of collective identities 
and effective interest groups (e.g., Mouffe 1999: 746, 752). 
 
10  The main preparation tool inside ministries are the so-called task force groups (työryhmä) 
composed, mainly, of civil servants.   
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The Finnish government’s policy program on citizen participation (henceforth 
CPPP)11 is one illustration of the changing ideals of civil society participation and 
contrasts interestingly with the modes of participation that were in fashion in the 
state committees. The main aim of this primarily web-based program is to promote 
active citizenship and the vitality of civil society. The CPPP handbook “Consult 
citizen – prepare wisely! A handbook for civil servants and office-holders” (hence-
forth CPPP 2005) underlines the right of all citizens to be heard and respected for 
their opinions. Regarding the organization of public hearings in connection with the 
preparation of laws and policies, the handbook recommends the invitation of “citi-
zens” and in addition to them non-governmental organizations. A footnote further 
specifies: “in this context, the term ‘citizens and non-governmental organizations’ is 
referring to all communities (yhteisöjä) and foundations (säätiöitä) that have a legal 
right to stay and operate in Finland” (CPPP 2005: 11). These definitions differ nota-
bly from the way in which group-level actors used to be defined in the heydays of 
neo-corporatism. Labor market associations, which have traditionally been seen as 
characteristic and constitutive participants of public policy making in Nordic socie-
ties, are not mentioned once. Political parties come across as “key actors in repre-
sentative democracy” and one of the CPPP’s program goals is indeed to enlighten 
citizens on the functions of political parties (ibid.: 6).  
In the course of its long history, the institution of the state committees has sur-
vived several changes in the thinking about the rules of policy drafting and civil 
society participation. However, the current changes, which concern all the basic 
elements of the established system of governance, seem to have proven decisive, at 
least for state committees in Finland. Of course, in societies that are increasingly 
global, multi-cultural, and whose economy and governance to varying degrees have 
escaped the national frames, the limits of the old policy preparation and participation 
paradigms are easy to see. The increased fluidity of allegiances and ways of mani-
festing identity and interests has multiplied the sites of democratic participation and 
contestation. The globalized economy has altered work life, and the manifestation of 
occupational-corporative interests and citizenship identities that underpinned mod-
ern welfare state projects have lost much of their former shape. Respectively, forms 
of association and ways of connecting these associations with public policy making 
are in a process of ongoing transition. In the past, the state committees were one of 
the key instruments in making governance inclusive and accessible to a wider circle 
of participants. In exchange for options for participation and influence, the commit-
tees also exercised control on particular policies and undermined resistance by very 
concrete and effective means of consensus-building. Surely they facilitated the rela-
tive absence of politics of pressure and open confrontation in Finland and Sweden. 
 
11 The CPPP documents including the handbook can be accessed through 
http://www.om.fi/24014.htm (20.10.2009). 
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From these perspectives, it will be interesting to see whether the rise of new types of 
associations combined with the fragmentation of the old, distinctively Nordic insti-
tutions of inclusion paves the way in a less consensual direction.  
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